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Comparative study
o the implementationn
of the ECHR at
the national level
This comparative analysis deals with the issues of application of
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) in national legal systems of
several StatesParties to theConvention.
These important issues are dealt with in eight articles
elaborating the application of the ECHR in Croatia, France,
Greece,Hungary, Italy, Poland,RussiaandSerbia.Countrieswere
selected following twocriteria: monisticordualistic systems– in
order to demonstrate different legal consequences in both
systemsdue to theapplicationof theEuropeanConvention, and
the commencement of the application of the Convention –
presenting the states that have been parties to the Convention
since its adoption, as well as those that have become so in the
past twodecades,which affects different level of activity of their
courts regarding the implementationof theConvention.
The experience from one country, as shown here, can serve as
the inspiration for improving the implementation in another, as
well as for overcoming certain obstacles and problems
identified in thearticles.
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Foreword
C omparative analysis before you is dedicated to the issue of the application of the European Convention on Human Rights in the national legal framework of several contracting states to the 
Convention.
This issues is of great importance, as the acceptance of the European 
Convention on Human Rights represents the first step towards its 
implementation in the national law, while the Convention leaves to 
the states the freedom to decide on their own how to respond to their 
commitment to respect and apply its provision. The way the state will 
do so, depends primarily on a reply to a question whether the European 
Convention can be applied directly, and on its status in the hierarchy 
of the national legal norms. Consequently, two legal systems emerged: 
monistic and dualistic. However, simple incorporation of the European 
Convention in domestic legal system is not capable of solving all 
problems emerging in the application of the European Convention, nor 
it is a guarantee of its complete and efficient application. Therefore, it 
is even more important to review the role of courts in this process. It 
is necessary to analyse up to which level national courts can examine 
conformity of the authorities’ procedures with the provisions of the 
European Convention, as well as the readiness of judges to apply 
the principles contained in the European Court of Human Rights 
jurisprudence, even in the cases when domestic legal framework 
provides clear basis.
Replies to these important issues are provided in the eight articles 
dealing with the application of the European Convention in Croatia, 
France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Russia and Serbia. The selection 
of countries was made following two principles: affiliation to the 
monistic, or dualistic legal system – in order to demonstrate different 
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Chapter I
The status of the European Convention
on Human Rights in Italy
Italy is a dualistic legal order. In this Chapter, we will analyse the formal 
position of the ECHR in the Italian hierarchy of legal norms. The Chapter 
is divided into three parts: the first part is devoted to the status of the 
ECHR before 2001; the second part deals with the status of the ECHR 
after 2001 and the two Constitutional Court landmark judgements of 
2007; the third part concerns the recent Constitutional Court case law.
I.1. The legal status of the ECHR before 2001
The European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) was signed by the 
Republic of Italy on November 4, 1950, while the First Protocol was 
signed on March 20, 1952. They were both ratified on October 26, 1955. 
Subsequently, Italian law no. 848 of August 4, 1955 incorporated the 
ECHR in Italian legal order, providing the authorisation for ratification 
and the order of execution. Article 2 of that law ordered execution 
of the Convention into domestic law. In fact, according to the Italian 
constitutional law, once ratified and executed by the legislature, 
an international treaty becomes integral part of domestic law. Italy 
recognised the competence of the Strasbourg organs to receive 
individual application in 1973.
The Italian Constitution does not mention the ECHR itself, nor it includes 
special provisions on international human rights treaties1. Until 2001, any 
express provision regulated the problem of the implementation or the 
hierarchical positioning of international agreements in domestic law. 
Some general articles take into consideration the relationship between 
the Italian legal order and the international law. Those articles are 
intended to express a general principle of openness of Italian Republic 
1 See the general overview on the ECHR status in Italian legal order in D. TEGA, “La 
Cedu e l’ordinamento italiano”, in M. CARTABIA (a cura di), “I diritti in azione”, Il 
Mulino, Bologna, 2007, 67–91; A. CALIGIURI, N. NAPOLETANO, “The Application of the 
ECHR in the Domestic Systems”, in The Italian Yearbook of International Law, 
2010, 125–159. About the protection of fundamental rights in the European 
dimension, mentioning the Italian perspective, M. CARTABIA, “L’ora dei diritti 
fondamentali nell’Unione Europea”, in M. Cartabia (a cura di), “I diritti in 
azione”, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2007, 13–66.
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to international legal order. Art. 10, paragraph 1, It. Const. reads: “Italian 
laws conform to the generally recognised norms of international law”, 
while Article 11 It. Const. reads: “Italy rejects war as an instrument of 
aggression against the freedoms of others peoples and as a means 
for settling international disputes; it agrees, on conditions of equality 
with other states, to the limitations of sovereignty necessary to create 
an order that ensures peace and justice among Nations; it promotes 
and encourages international organisations having such ends in view”. 
Article 11 was written to allow Italian participation to United Nations.
On these grounds, legal scholars have tried to find a constitutional 
“anchor” for the ECHR and several possibilities have been suggested. 
According to some scholars, a potential basis was found in Article 
10, paragraph 1, as the ECHR includes general rules that could be 
considered part of the “generally recognised norms of international 
law”. For other scholars, the ECHR could enjoy the protection of Article 
11. The limitation of sovereignty needed to ensure peace and justice 
among the Nations, which is mentioned in this Article, could be 
extended to the Council of Europe system for the protection of human 
rights. Furthermore, some other authors have invoked Article 2 It. 
Const., which protects “inviolable rights”.
All these theories aimed at justifying a higher position of the Convention 
in the hierarchy of norms. However, the Italian Constitutional Court 
rejected all of them. On the one side, the Court affirmed that Article 
10, paragraph 1, does not apply to international covenants. Article 10, 
paragraph 1, confines itself to the automatic incorporation of general 
principles of international law and to customary law. On the other side, 
under Article 11 no international treaty can entail any limitation of 
sovereignty. In fact, the Italian Constitutional Court referred to Article 
11 to justify Italian membership to EEC and the supremacy of EU Law 
since its decision no. 183/1973. The meaning of Article 11 was extended 
to allow limitations of sovereignty related to the European integration 
process. However, the Court always rejected the application of the 
same mechanism to the ECHR2.
2 The different theories aiming at recognising a constitutional status to the ECHR 
despite its incorporation by ordinary law are deeply described in G. MARTINICO, 
O. POLLICINO, “Report on Italy”, in G. MARTINICO, O. POLLICINO (eds.), “The National 
Judicial Treatment of the ECHR and EU Law. A Comparative Constitutional 
Perspective”, Europa Law Publishing, Groningen, 2010, 271–299, 282–283; D. 
TEGA, “The Constitutional Background of the 2007 Revolution. The Jurisprudence 
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Therefore, until 2001, from a formal point of view, due to the ratification 
and the execution order, the ECHR obtained the force of the ordinary 
law. For this reason, the last-in-time rule, or the lex posterior principle, 
could have emerged. In fact, these international norms, incorporated 
in Italian law no. 848/1955, could have been rendered invalid by later 
national norms, i.e. the subsequent provision could have abrogated the 
anterior rule3. Indeed, the last-in-time rule was not applied to the ECHR. 
For many years, Italian courts did not make frequent reference to the 
ECHR. The explanation of this behaviour has been found in the fact that 
the ECHR provisions overlap to a great extent with those of the rights 
already protected under the Italian Constitution. Moreover, sometimes 
the application of the ECHR as source of autonomous rights was denied 
because of the vague and indeterminate nature of its norms. This 
argument was referred to the so called “non-self-executing” character 
of conventional norms and concerned their incomplete content4. 
of the Constitutional Court”, in G. REPETTO (ed.), “The Constitutional Relevance of 
the ECHR in Domestic and European Law. An Italian Perspective”, Intersentia, 
Cambridge-Antwerp-Portland, 2013, 25–36, 26–27.
3 For a general analysis of the last-in-time rule application to international 
norms when the national legal system does not give higher priority to 
treaty norms, B. CONFORTI, “National Courts and the International Law of 
Human Rights”, in B. CONFORTI, F. FRANCIONI (eds.), “Enforcing Human Rights in 
Domestic Courts”, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, The Hague-Boston-London, 
1997, 3–14, 11. When a formal superiority is not sanctioned, the inconsistency 
between a treaty rule and a subsequent national rule is often solved through 
interpretation, to increase the cases of prevalence of the international 
provision even if it is anterior. The Author describes different criteria to ensure 
prevalence to anterior international norm. The most common criterion is the 
presumption of conformity of the domestic law to international law. Another 
criterion considers the convention a special law, thus applying the principle 
lex posterior generalis non derogat priori speciali. This criterion was applied 
by Italian courts to the relations between conventions of uniform law or of 
cooperation in judicial matters and Italian domestic provisions in the field 
of private and procedural law. The same criterion was applied by Italian 
Constitutional Court to the ECHR only once, in decision no. 10/1993, stating 
that the law no. 848/1955 of ratification and execution of the Convention had 
an “atypical competence”. The criterion is based on the special character of 
the subject matter governed by the international treaty. Another criterion 
– not frequent in Italian experience – considers that the subsequent law 
prevails only if there is a “clear indication” of the intention of the law-maker to 
derogate from the treaty.
4 The cases in which courts, in order not to apply conventional norms, focus on 
their vague and indeterminate nature are critically discussed by B. CONFORTI, 
“National Courts and the International Law of Human Rights”, quoted above, 8.
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Thus, the judiciary tended essentially to use the Convention as a 
supplementary aid when interpreting domestic law.
Progressively, decisions referring to the provisions of the Convention 
became more frequent, especially in criminal cases5. The Supreme 
Court (Corte di Cassazione) had rejected the view that the ECHR may 
possess a constitutional rank, because of incorporation as an ordinary 
law. However, the Supreme Court itself used the ECHR to confirm 
and reaffirm some constitutional rights. In the same way, the Italian 
Constitutional Court referred to the Convention to confirm the meaning 
of those rights directly protected under the Italian Constitution. The 
ECHR was therefore an interpretative tool to support domestic law 
interpretation in conformity with constitutional rights. In the end, 
the Italian Constitutional Court accepted, at least implicitly, the ECHR 
provisions embodied the same category of fundamental human right 
that find protection in the Italian Constitution. Thus, the ECHR rights fell 
essentially within the field of constitutional law6. In short, it is possible 
5 A. DRZEMCZEWSKI, “European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law. A 
Comparative Study”, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983, 145–154, quoting V. 
GREMENTIERI, N. TROCKER, “The Protection of Human Rights in Constitutional 
Law: Italy, in Italian National Reports to the IXth International Congress of 
Comparative Law”, Tehran, 1974, 491–504. At the beginning of the Eighties, the 
Author considered the number of Italian Supreme Court judgements referring 
to the ECHR “impressive” and observed academic interest in the Convention 
was rapidly growing.
6 See for example the so called San Michele case, decision no. 98/1965, “Il Foro 
italiano”, 1966, I, 8–14, 13, in which the Court referred to Article 6 the ECHR to 
confirm that the right to a fair trial was one of the inviolable rights guaranteed 
in art. 2 It. Const; decision no. 124/1972, “Il Foro Italiano”, 1972, I, 1897–1898, 
affirming that an acquittal for insufficient proof was not contrary to Article 27 
It. Const. and to the ECHR; decision no. 178/1973, “Il Foro Italiano”, 1973, 15–16, 
quashing some articles of Italian Criminal Code contrary to Article 3 and Article 
24 It. Const., which guarantee equality before the law and the right to defence, 
as well as to Article 6, paragraph 3, c), the ECHR. For other examples see A. 
DRZEMCZEWSKI, “European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law”, quoted 
above, 149.
 The use of the Convention as an interpretative tool has been much stronger 
since the 1990s. See, for example, decision no. 388/1999, in which the 
Constitutional Court underlined that human rights enjoy a constitutional 
guarantee irrespective of the formal position of their respective source 
in the hierarchy of norms. This is the outcome of the evolution of Italian 
Constitutional Court jurisprudence until 2007. For a deep analysis of the 
constitutional case law, D. TEGA, “The Constitutional Background of the 2007 
Revolution. The Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court”, quoted above, 
28–36. The Author distinguishes the constitutional jurisprudence before 2007 
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to affirm that, before 2001, while the ECHR had formally the force of an 
ordinary law, materially it had the meaning of a constitutional norm.
In order to understand the evolution of the ECHR in domestic law, it 
is useful to describe some general features of the Italian legal system. 
First, the Italian judicial system includes civil, penal and administrative 
courts. The violation of subjective rights lays under the jurisdiction of 
civil courts, while the violation of a rule made in the public interest 
lays under the jurisdiction of administrative courts. Second, Article 
107, paragraph 3, It. Const. reads that judges are distinguished only 
by their different functions, so that there is not a hierarchical relation 
between higher and lower courts. The Supreme Court (Corte di 
Cassazione) is the highest civil and penal court, while the Council of 
State (Consiglio di Stato) is the highest administrative court. In case 
of conflict between jurisdictions, the Corte di Cassazione has the last 
word. Third, under Article 134 It. Const., the Constitutional Court 
adjudicates controversies on the constitutional legitimacy of laws and 
enactments having force of law issued by the State and the Regions. In 
relation to civil, penal or administrative matters, the constitutionality 
of a law may only be questioned during a trial incidenter tantum. The 
judge of the trial has to decide if the constitutional issue is relevant 
to the decision of the case before him and if it is not manifestly 
unfounded. Therefore, the jurisdiction of Italian Constitutional Court is 
limited to cases referred to it by ordinary courts. Thus, the protection 
of fundamental rights is not secured by means of a direct individual 
appeal to the Constitutional Court, challenging the law on grounds of 
constitutionality, but only incidentally7.
in three “phases”. The first, between 1960 and 1993, is the phase of “traditional 
dualism”. Between the end of the Eighties and the early 2000s, a “more modern 
dualism” arose. The Constitutional Court referred to the Convention, as well as 
to other international human rights Treaties, to “discover” new constitutional 
rights through the “open clause” of Article 2 It. Const. protecting “inviolable 
rights”. The third phase is called “duality in transformation”: without giving 
international treaties a supralegislative status, the Court started questioning 
the legislation compliance with international commitments.
 All Italian Constitutional Court judgements are available in www.
cortecostituzionale.it; an English summary of more recent decisions is now 
available at http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionJudgment.do.
7 See A. DRZEMCZEWSKI, “European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law”, 
quoted above, 148–149 for a short description of the main features of Italian 
legal system. Alternatively, the constitutionality of a law can be adjudicated by 
the Italian Constitutional Court by procedure in via principale, which regards 
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I.2. The Constitutional Reform of 2001 and the Italian 
 Constitutional Court “twin” judgements of 2007
The Italian Constitutional Law no. 3 of 2001 introduced a specific 
reference to international obligations into Article 117, paragraph 1, It. 
Const.: “Legislative powers shall be vested in the State and the Regions 
in compliance with the Constitution and with the constraints deriving 
from European Union law and international obligations”. A special 
“anchor” to international treaties was so introduced for the first time 
into the Constitution.
Under Article 117, paragraph 1, the Italian Constitutional Court 
recognised a supralegislative rank to the ECHR. The status of the ECHR 
changed due to two landmark judgments, no. 348 and 349/2007. To 
understand the rationale of the “twin” 2007 leading case, it is necessary 
to look at the background. Since the 1990s the Supreme Court and 
ordinary judges had referred more and more to Strasbourg case law8. 
A cultural change arose, as lawyers increased their knowledge of the 
Strasbourg mechanism. Non-profit associations contributed to spread 
principles from Strasbourg jurisprudence, asking for their application in 
domestic trials. Judges started to face directly the Strasbourg decisions 
to define and interpret the applicable law. In the early 2000s, some 
courts began to apply the ECHR in the same way they applied EU law. 
Since the leading case Granital no. 170/1984, the Italian Constitutional 
Court stated that priority must be accorded to EU law in conflict with 
national law and that the conflict must be solved by ordinary courts. 
the review of a statute or legislation concerning the State and the Regions. For 
a general overview of the Italian constitutional review of legislation model, 
see now M. CARTABIA, “Of Bridges and Walls: The “Italian Style” of Constitutional 
Adjudication”, in “Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia, 25 Years”, 
International Conference, Bled, Slovenia, June 2016, Conference Proceedings, 
69–84, and in Italian Journal of Public Law, Vol. 8, Issue n. 1/2016, 37–55.
8 Especially the Supreme Court in criminal cases, referring to the procedural 
guarantees of a fair trial under Article 6 the ECHR; see G. REPETTO, “Rethinking 
a Constitutional Role for the ECHR. The Dilemmas of Incorporation into Italian 
Domestic Law”, in G. REPETTO (ed.), “The Constitutional Relevance of the ECHR in 
Domestic and European Law. An Italian Perspective”, Intersentia, Cambridge-
Antwerp-Portland, 2013, 37–53, 38, and the Supreme Court leading cases no. 
2194/1993; no. 6672/1998 and no. 28507/2005. The Author quotes, for further 
references to this trend, E. CANNIZZARO, “The Effect of the ECHR on the Italian 
Legal Order: Direct Effect and Supremacy”, XIX Italian Yearbook of International 
Law, 2009, 173, 175–177.
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Thus, every judge has to apply EU law, if provided with direct effect, 
and to decide the non-application of the domestic norm. Some courts 
considered the same solution viable for the ECHR. They resolved 
disputes giving direct application to the ECHR norms and deciding 
the non-application of the relevant internal rules9. The Constitutional 
Court “twin” judgments of 2007 rejected this new judicial approach 
emerging in ordinary jurisprudence and reaffirmed that judicial review 
of legislation falls within the exclusive competence of the Constitutional 
Court. At the same time, the Constitutional Court accepted to give the 
Convention a higher ranking and to set a mechanism to quash the law 
incompatible with the Convention itself.
Decisions no. 348 and 349/2007 stated the ECHR has an “intermediate” 
ranking (norma interposta) between law and the Constitution, so that 
a law violating the Convention is indirectly incompatible with Article 
117, paragraph 1, It. Const. and must be quashed10. Furthermore, 
the Constitutional Court stated that every judge, when applying a 
domestic norm that appears incompatible with the ECHR, shall first try 
an interpretation of the Italian norm in conformity with the ECHR. If 
the interpretation “in compliance” is not possible, then the judge must 
make a referral order to the Constitutional Court, based on Article 117, 
paragraph 1. In doing so, the judge has to demonstrate the ground 
on which the domestic law does not comply with the ECHR. Once the 
referral order is submitted, the Constitutional Court makes a two-step 
reasoning process. First, the Constitutional Court verifies if the ECHR 
norm, as interpreted by the Strasbourg Court, is compatible with the 
Italian Constitution. Second, the Court compares the domestic norm 
with the Convention, as interpreted by the ECtHR. The first step of this 
reasoning entails that the incorporation of the ECHR finds its limits in 
the constitutional norms. Hence, the Italian Constitutional Court can 
make a barrier to the entry of conventional norms whenever they 
collide with constitutional norms.
9 This approach was “surprising, if not revolutionary” and “daring” for G. F. FERRARI, 
“National Judges and Supranational Law. On the Effective Application of EU 
Law and the ECHR”, in G. MARTINICO, O. POLLICINO (eds.), “The National Judicial 
Treatment of the ECHR and EU Law. A Comparative Constitutional Perspective”, 
Europa Law Publishing, Groningen, 2010, 25.
10 Decisions no. 348 and 349 concerned expropriation and the right of owners to 
a reasonable compensation in relation to the market value of the expropriated 
lands. The ECtHR has in several occasions sanctioned Italian regulation on the 
matter under Article 1 Prot. n. 1 ECHR. See the ECtHR, Scordino v. Italy, May 29, 2006.
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Two other principles are also relevant and must be taken into 
consideration. First, the Italian Constitutional Court confirmed the 
different status of the ECHR and EU law. If the ECHR norms were to share 
the EU law nature, they would overtake conflicting national law without 
the balancing intervention of the Constitutional Court. In the Court’s 
opinion, Article 11 It. Const. does not apply to the ECHR, because the 
Council of Europe system for the protection of human rights did not set 
up a “supranational legal order” as the EEC first, and EU then, did.
Second, the Italian Constitutional Court made a strong reference 
to the Strasbourg case law, recognising to the ECtHR a prominent 
role as interpreter of the Convention. The Court so considered the 
Convention as a living instrument, that has to be applied in conformity 
with Strasbourg jurisprudence11. The Constitutional Court made 
no distinction between Strasbourg decisions against Italy on the 
unconventionality of a specific Italian domestic rule at issue, according 
to Article 46 ECHR, and Strasbourg jurisprudence in general, including 
decisions given in different contexts against other States12.
Looking at the relation between the ECHR and the Italian legal order, 
the “twin” judgments somehow confirmed the Italian dualistic model, 
distinguishing between EU law and the ECHR and preventing non-
application of domestic law by ordinary courts in case of the ECHR 
incompatibility. However, the “twin” judgments admitted an implicit 
integration between the ECHR and domestic law, strongly asking Italian 
courts to interpret domestic law in conformity with the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence and considering that the Convention lives through the 
ECtHR case law.
The outcomes of the “twin” judgments can be summarised as follow: 
the ECHR possesses a hierarchical status superior to ordinary law and 
11 On the decisions no. 348 and 349 see G. REPETTO, “Rethinking a Constitutional 
Role for the ECHR. The Dilemmas of Incorporation into Italian Domestic 
Law”, quoted above, 39–41; O. POLLICINO, “Constitutional Court at the cross 
road between parochialism and co-operative constitutionalism”, in European 
Constitutional Law Review (4) (2008), 363 ss.; F. BIONDI DAL MONTE, F. FONTANELLI, 
“The Decision No. 348 and 349/2007 of the Italian Constitutional Court: The 
Efficacy of the European Convention on the Italian Legal System”, in German 
Law Journal, Vol. 09, No. 07, 2008, 889–932.
12 The point is underlined by A. GUAZZAROTTI, “Strasbourg Jurisprudence as an 
Input for “Cultural Evolution” in Italian Judicial Practise”, in G. REPETTO (ed.), 
“The Constitutional Relevance of the ECHR in Domestic and European Law. An 
Italian Perspective”, Intersentia, Cambridge-Antwerp-Portland, 2013, 55–68, 63.
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it has acquired a predominant position into domestic legal order; the 
conflict between domestic law and the Convention has been shaped 
as a constitutional conflict carried out before the Constitutional Court; 
national judges are obliged to interpret domestic law in conformity 
with the interpretation given by the Strasbourg Court.
I.3. The recent constitutional case law: the criterion
 of “the greatest expansion of fundamental rights”
The principles displayed in the “twin” judgements were confirmed by 
following constitutional jurisprudence. However, they were in some way 
reshaped. In decision no. 311/2009, the Constitutional Court admitted 
that several rights guaranteed under the Convention, i.e. the right to 
life under Article 2 ECHR and the prohibition of torture under Article 3 
ECHR, embody international customary law, so that they can be directly 
applied by judges on the basis of Article 10, paragraph 1, It. Const.
In decision no. 317/2009, the Constitutional Court clarified the criterion 
of “the greatest expansion of fundamental rights”. The Court stated that 
“It is evident that this Court not only cannot permit Article 117 (1) of the 
Constitution to determine a lower level of protection compared to that 
already existing under internal law, but neither can it be accepted that 
a higher level of protection which it is possible to introduce through 
the same mechanism should be denied to the holders of a fundamental 
right. The consequence of this reasoning is that the comparison 
between the Convention protection and constitutional protection of 
fundamental rights must be carried out seeking to obtain the greatest 
expansion of guarantees, including through the development of the 
potential inherent in the constitutional norms which concern the same 
rights”. The Constitution and the ECHR are so joined to pursue the 
greatest expansion of fundamental rights common to both catalogues. 
If a different level of protection exists between constitutional norms 
and conventional norms, prevalence will be given to the rule that 
more extensively protects the individual right at stake13. Thus, the final 
criterion does not call upon the formal rank of norms (constitutional 
norms and supralegislative norms as the ECHR), but the substantial 
degree of protection.
13 G. REPETTO, “Rethinking a Constitutional Role for the ECHR. The Dilemmas of 
Incorporation into Italian Domestic Law”, quoted above, 47.
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In the same decision no. 317 of 2009, the Italian Constitutional 
Court also affirmed: “The concept of the greatest expansion of 
protection must include, as already clarified in judgements no. 348 
and 349 of 2007, a requirement to weight up the right against other 
constitutionally protected interest that is with other constitutional 
rules which in turn guarantee the fundamental rights which may be 
affected by the expansion of one individual protection. This balancing 
is to be carried out primarily by the legislature, but it is also a matter 
for this Court when interpreting constitutional law [....]. The overall 
result of the supplementation of the guarantees under national law 
must be positive, in the sense that the impact of individual the ECHR 
rules on Italian law must result in an increase in protection for the 
entire system of fundamental rights”14. Finally, it is the Constitutional 
Court itself that is requested to strike a fair balance between rights 
and general interests at stake.
The following decision no. 80/2011 confirmed that the review of 
legislation on the ground of conventionality belongs to the exclusive 
competence of the Constitutional Court. The Court clearly reaffirmed 
that the mechanism set up by the “twin” judgements does not change 
as a result of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Again, doubts 
have arisen as to whether the ECHR could have the same position 
and force of EU law due to Article 6 of the Treaty of Lisbon15. The 
Constitutional Court reiterated that Article 11 It. Const. is confined to EU 
law and does not apply to the ECHR.
Up to the present time, the Italian Constitutional Court has never 
declared the incompatibility of a conventional norm with constitutional 
norms. In the “twin” judgments the Court has emphasised obedience 
to the Strasbourg case law, affirming that the exact meaning of the 
ECHR can be ascertained only as it is interpreted by the ECtHR. Instead, 
14 Decision no. 317/2009, para. 7, quoted by G. REPETTO, “Rethinking a Constitutional 
Role for the ECHR. The Dilemmas of Incorporation into Italian Domestic Law”, 47.
15 Article 6, paragraphs 2 and 3, Treaty on the European Union reads: “2. The Union 
shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union’s competences 
as defined in the Treaties. 3. Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and 
as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, 
shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law”.
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in following judgments the Court starts using interpretative tools to 
justify a margin of discretion while applying the ECHR16.
On the one hand, the Court makes reference to general interests 
protected by the Italian legal system. In this way, it is for the Court to 
declare where the fair balance lies between the rights and the legitimate 
interests at issue. The Court sometimes refers to the ECtHR margin of 
appreciation doctrine, according to which national authorities enjoy 
some discretion in fulfilling their obligations under the ECHR17. In fact, 
the ECtHR stated since its early decisions that the Convention leaves to 
each Contracting State, in the first place, the task of securing the rights 
and liberties it enshrines. The machinery of protection established 
by the Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding 
human rights. Thus, the Constitutional Court shapes the fair balance 
between rights and general interest using the margin of discretion that 
the ECHR system in principle allows.
On the other hand, the Italian Constitutional Court resolves potential 
conflicts between constitutional norms and conventional norms 
through the technique of distinguishing18. The same strategy is 
16 For a case of non-obedience to a Strasbourg precedent, see the so-called Maggio 
case, decision no. 264/2012, following ECtHR, Maggio and others v. Italy, May 31, 
2011. The Constitutional Court considered a challenge to legislation modifying 
the system to calculate pensions of Italian workers employed in Switzerland. 
Due to a law of “authentic interpretation”, these Italian pensions were to be 
calculated in a different way than before, thus resulting lower. The Court ruled 
that the applicants had no legitimate expectations to a pension in line with 
the previous system of calculation, since the contested legislation expressed 
the principles of equality and solidarity, prevailing within the balancing text 
of rights and interests at stake. For a general overview of Italian Constitutional 
recent case law in English, see now P. FARAGUNA, M. MASSA, D. TEGA, M. CARTABIA, 
“Developments in Italian Constitutional Law: The Year 2015 in Review”, Int’l 
J. Const. L. Blog, Mar. 4, 2016, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/02/
developments-in-italian-constitutional-law-the-year-2015-in-review
17 S. GREER, “The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the 
European Convention on Human Rights”, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 2000, 5.
18 For example, Constitutional Court decision no. 236/2011, concerning the 
principle of nulla poena sine lege. The decision has been intended as a reply to 
ECtHR, Grand Chamber, 17 September 2009, Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2), application 
no. 10249/03. The Italian Constitutional Court stated the Strasbourg precedent 
“although aimed at establishing a general principle [...], remains nonetheless 
linked to the concreteness of the case in which it was ruled: the fact that the 
European Court is called to assess upon a material case and, most of all, the 
specificity of the single case issued, are factors to be carefully weighed and 
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applied by the Supreme Court. The Constitutional Court itself often 
asks ordinary courts to distinguish their cases from the relevant 
precedents of Strasbourg. Legal scholars recognise that the technique 
of distinguishing is admissible, as the ECtHR has jurisdiction on the 
facts of the case. This technique also increases the dialogue between 
the ECtHR and Italian courts, questioning if and in which circumstances 
a situation could entail a violation of the Convention19. Nevertheless, 
a superficial application of the technique could jeopardise the respect 
for Strasbourg precedents and it could threaten the principle of legal 
certainty, the principle of equal treatment and the respect for legitimate 
expectations.
Chapter II
National Courts referral to the European Court
of Human Rights case law in Italian judgements
In the previous Chapter, we provided some information on the behaviour 
of the judiciary before the Italian Constitutional Court landmark 
decisions no. 348 and 349/2007. We explained how the referral to the 
ECtHR case law is more and more frequent in recent years and how 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence has become pervasive in legal reasoning 
concerning human rights. As a whole, the ECHR has a prominent role 
in driving interpretation of national law. In the previous Chapter, we 
illustrated also that the “twin” judgments aimed at preventing ordinary 
judges from not applying national law incompatible with the ECHR.
In this Chapter, we will evaluate if the Italian highest courts and ordinary 
courts comply with the “twin” judgments’ directives. This issue was 
addressed by a comprehensive study recently conducted by an Italian 
legal scholar. We will refer to this study, quoting the main outcomes20.
taken into account by the Constitutional Court, when applying the principles 
ascertained by the Strasbourg Court at the domestic level, in order to review 
the constitutionality of one norm allegedly at odds with that principles”. The 
decision is quoted by A. GUAZZAROTTI, “Strasbourg Jurisprudence as an Input for 
“Cultural Evolution” in Italian Judicial Practise”, quoted above, 65.
19 A. GUAZZAROTTI, “Strasbourg Jurisprudence as an Input for “Cultural Evolution” in 
Italian Judicial Practise”, quoted above, 63.
20 I. CARLOTTO, “I giudici italiani e il divieto di applicazione diretta della Convenzione 
europea dei diritti dell’uomo dopo il Trattato di Lisbona”, in L. CAPPUCCIO, E. 
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Regarding the highest courts behaviour, both the Supreme Court and 
the Council of State fully respect the “twin” judgments model21. This 
means that they do not state the direct non-application of national law 
incompatible with the ECHR. In fact, when a problem of compatibility 
arises, the highest courts firstly attempt to give the domestic law an 
interpretation “in conformity with” the Strasbourg case law. This 
attempt sometimes leads to a strong modulation of the meaning of the 
written legal text. Only when the interpretation “in conformity with” is 
not possible, as a second step the highest courts make a referral order 
to the Constitutional Court, asking for the invalidation of the national 
law. Furthermore, as illustrated in the previous Chapter, the highest 
courts “shape” the precedents of the ECtHR through the technique 
of distinguishing. In these cases, it is the Court of Strasbourg that, 
when an application is submitted, verify if the facts of the cases were 
different – so that the condition for distinguishing did exist – and if the 
implementation of the ECHR in the Italian legal order was correct.
The overview of ordinary courts’ behaviour is more complicated. Most 
of the judges – civil, penal, as well as administrative judges – follow 
the Constitutional Court’s directives22. However, a minority of them 
LAMARQUE, “Dove va il sistema italiano accentrato di controllo di costituzionalità. 
Ragionando intorno al libro di Víctor Ferreres Comella Constitutional Courts 
and Democratic Value”, Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 2013, 177–240. See also 
the previous research of the same Author, I. CARLOTTO, “I giudici comuni e gli 
obblighi internazionali dopo le sentenze n. 348 e n. 349 del 2007 della Corte 
costituzionale: un’analisi sul seguito giurisprudenziale (Parte I)”, in Politica del 
diritto, 2010, 76 ss.
21 See, among others, Supreme Criminal Court (Corte di Cassazione penale), VI 
Section, 8 June 2012, no. 22301; Supreme Criminal Court, VI Section, 15 June 
2011, no. 24039; Supreme Criminal Court, II Section, 15 January 2013, no. 3809; 
Supreme Criminal Court, V Section, 23 October 2012, no. 41249; Supreme Court, 
United Sections, 25 October 2012, no. 41694, on unlawful detention; Supreme 
Court, United Sections, 10 September 2012, no. 34472, on the ECtHR Scoppola 
case, concerning the principle of nulla poena sine lege under Article 7 ECHR; 
Supreme Court, United Sections, 13 June 2012, no. 9595 and 20 June 2012, no. 
10130; Supreme Civil Court, VI Section, 27 November 2012, no. 21053 to no. 
21060 and 14 December 2012, no. 23154. Concerning administrative issues, 
Council of State, VI Section, 9 August 2011, no. 4723 and 2 April 2012, no. 1957, 
all quoted by I. CARLOTTO, “I giudici italiani e il divieto di applicazione diretta 
della Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo dopo il Trattato di Lisbona”, 
cited above, 204, 222, 225.
22 For example, in the administrative jurisprudence, Regional Administrative 
Tribunal (Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale), Lombardia, Milan, II Section, 
7 Augut 2012, no. 2178; Regional Administrative Tribunal Trentino Alto Adige, 
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resists the logic of the “twin” judgements, giving a direct application 
of the ECHR instead of making a referral order to the Constitutional 
Court23. This behaviour is not necessarily a form of “rebellion”. Most 
of the time, this results from a misunderstanding and misapplication 
of different charters of rights. Sometimes ordinary judges give direct 
application to the ECHR because they unintentionally overlap the 
ECHR with the Charter of Fundamental Right of the European Union. It 
is well known that the Charter of Fundamental Right of the European 
Union confines itself into the scope of EU Law. Yet in practice it is not 
clearly distinguishable what is inside and what is outside the scope of 
4 April 2012, no. 101; Regional Administrative Tribunal Calabria, ordinance 
13 October 2011, no. 732; Regional Administrative Tribunal Lazio, Rome, 
I Section, 25 June 2012, no. 5769 and 16 May 2012, no. 4455, 4456, 4457; 
Regional Admnistrative Tribunal Sicilia, Palermo, ordinance 10 January 2012; 
Regional Administrative Tribunal Toscana, 15 March 2012, no. 544; Regional 
Administrative Tribunal Umbria, 21 January 2013, no. 29, all quoted by I. 
CARLOTTO, “I giudici italiani e il divieto di applicazione diretta della Convenzione 
europea dei diritti dell’uomo dopo il Trattato di Lisbona”, cited above, 205. 
Civil and penal ordinary courts’ judgements quoted by I. CARLOTTO are dozens, 
regarding the Court of Appeal of L’Aquila, Venezia and the Tribunals of Nardò, 
Pozzuoli, Lecce, Nocera Inferiore, Cagliari. See “I giudici italiani e il divieto di 
applicazione diretta della Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo dopo il 
Trattato di Lisbona”, 210.
23 Regional Administrative Tribunal Campania, V Section, 13 December 2011, 
no. 5764; Regional Administrative Tribunal Lazio, Rome, III Section, 5 January 
2011, no. 40; Regional Administrative Tribunal Puglia, I Section, 7 June 2012, no. 
289 and III Section, 10 January 2013, no. 20, all confusing the ECHR and the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. Regional Administrative Tribunal Lombardia, 
Brescia, II Section, 9 February 2012, no. 213 and 214; 6 September 2012, no. 1521 
and 22 November 2012, no. 1836; Regional Administrative Tribunal Lombardia, 
Milan, III Section, 1 February 2013, no. 313; Regional Administrative Tribunal 
Veneto, III Section, 21 November 2012, no. 1430; Regional Administrative 
Tribunal Lazio, Rome, I Section, 28 January 2013, no. 966 and 973; 4 February 
2013, no. 1180, concerning compensation for the length of proceedings, 
provided non-application of Italian law on the matter (Legge Pinto) and 
condemned the Public Administration to make financial resources available 
in order to pay compensation. See also Regional Administrative Tribunal 
Sicilia, Palermo, II Section, 9 March 2011, no. 418 and 14 October 2011, no. 
1864 evaluating family ties of aliens under Article 8 ECHR, even if the relevant 
domestic law does not oblige the public administration to take them into 
consideration. Among civil and penal courts, Tribunal of Milan, Labour Section, 
17 May 2011, no. 2474; Tribunal of Cassino, 27 September 2011; Corte di Assise, 
Terni, 6 July 2011; Court of Appeal, Firenze, Labour Section, 26 April 2011, no. 
534; Tribunal of Milan, 8 July 2011, no. 3558. Cfr. I. CARLOTTO, “I giudici italiani e il 
divieto di applicazione diretta della Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo 
dopo il Trattato di Lisbona”, 206–210, 213–214.
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EU Law. Furthermore, the constitutional substance of all human rights 
encourages their direct application irrespectively of their formal source. 
Indeed, the supremacy of human rights is not in question. However, the 
attitude of a minority of judges to self-determine the non-application of 
domestic law challenges the competence of the Constitutional Court. In 
conclusion, the main problem is who decides not to apply the domestic 
law incompatible with the ECHR and to what extent. In fact, only the 
Constitutional Court decisions are compulsory erga omnes. Most of the 
ordinary courts refer to the Constitutional Court. Only a minority of 
them acts autonomously. All in all, the consistency of the Constitutional 
Court, the Supreme Court and the Council of State jurisprudence 
ensures legal certainty and stability. As recognised by legal writers, the 
highest courts can regularly quash the decisions of lower courts that 
deviate from existing precedents24.
Chapter III
Conclusions and Recommendations
As we illustrated in the previous Chapters, the ECHR status in Italian 
legal order can be summarised as follows:
a. the ECHR has a supralegislative rank;
b. all the courts are obliged to implement conventional rights 
following the ECtHR case law; all the judges must interpret 
domestic law as far as possible in conformity with the 
ECtHR living interpretation;
c. the judicial review of legislation on the ground on 
conventionality is an exclusive competence of the 
Constitutional Court. When the interpretation in 
conformity with the Convention is not possible, ordinary 
courts must make a referral to the Constitutional Court, 
in order to evaluate the consistency of the internal norm 
with the ECHR;
d. the Italian Constitutional Court recognises a prominent 
role to the ECtHR interpretation, but eventually it is for the 
24 V. FERRERES COMELLA, Constitutional Courts and Democratic Values, 22, quoted by 
I. Carlotto, “I giudici italiani e il divieto di applicazione diretta della Convenzione 
europea dei diritti dell’uomo dopo il Trattato di Lisbona”, cited above, 225.
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Constitutional Court to strike the fair balance between all 
the rights and the general interests at stake.
As Keller and Stone had demonstrated, there was not a causal linkage 
between ex ante monism and dualism and the reception of the ECHR. 
The way the ECHR is incorporated is an outcome of the reception 
process which, in turn, will impinge on reception ex post. The Italian 
experience confirms that the assumption that dualistic States have, 
a priori, an unfriendly attitude towards international law, and will, 
therefore, generate a relatively poorer rights record, is untenable25. 
The spread of the Strasbourg Court principles has grown impressively 
in recent years. The attitude of courts of every level to quote the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence is wide.
As legal scholars affirmed years ago, international protection of human 
rights has reached an impressive scope regarding both the rights 
covered and the number of countries bound. However, this protection 
remains unsatisfactory if the related obligations are not implemented in 
the real life. The responsibility of an effective implementation of human 
rights to a great extent is assigned to the judiciary. Courts participate in 
the “interpretative enterprise” of internationally shared values and act 
independently from the governments in power. Surely, interpretation 
and application of human rights cannot be a substitute for democratic 
elections and political decision. Nonetheless, human right adjudication 
provided by independent judges is an indispensable instrument for 
a democratic and liberal society. Developing a jurisdictional model 
that is responsive to the universal recognition of a minimum human 
rights core is part of the aims of a democratic legal order26. This is 
25 H. KELLER, A. STONE SWEET (eds.), “A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on 
National Legal Systems”, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, 685–686. That 
point accepted, some States, including Italy, have found it difficult to confer 
supralegislative rank on the Convention precisely because of their dualistic 
natures, though there is a great deal of variation even among this small group. 
Dualistic countries tend to incorporate through statute, whereas monist States 
tend to do so through judicial decision. Clearly, a monistic constitutional 
structure can provide the judiciary with more leeway in the reception process. 
In dualistic countries where a powerful Constitutional or Supreme Court 
defends national human rights, the Authors observed reticence among judges 
to base their rulings on the Convention as an independent source of rights.
26 F. FRANCIONI, “The Jurisprudence of International Human Rights Enforcement: 
Reflections on the Italian Experience”, in B. CONFORTI, F. FRANCIONI (eds,), 
“Enforcing Human Rights in Domestic Courts”, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, The 
Hague-Boston-London, 1997, 15–34, 15, concluding that the hiatus between 
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much more true if we considered that international remedies, as the 
ECtHR mechanism, depend on the exhaustion of domestic remedies27. 
This requirement is based on the assumption that the domestic legal 
order will provide an effective remedy for the violation of conventional 
rights. The requirement finally expresses the subsidiary nature of the 
ECHR system. National authorities, and especially national courts, are 
in a “better position” to assure the effective implementation of human 
rights, because they are in direct contact with vital forces, national 
traditions and cultural backgrounds of their countries.
If this is true, in our opinion the main point is that the interpretation 
and application of the ECtHR case law into the domestic legal order 
must follow a clear and well established mechanism. In the previous 
Chapters, we illustrated the evolution of the Constitutional Court’s 
jurisprudence and the consistency of the judicial behaviour with the 
Constitutional Court’s directive. The stability of this mechanism and the 
coherence between judgments are meaningful to fulfil a responsive 
jurisdictional model. In fact, stability and coherence guarantee values 
that are fundamental to the effectiveness of human rights, like legal 
certainty and equal treatment. Surely, modern legal systems are 
complex. The overlapping of charters of rights can jeopardise the 
protection of human rights instead of increasing their effectiveness. 
Thus, assuring full knowledge and awareness of the different sets 
of human right legal sources currently existing, and their respective 
mechanism should be an aim of primary importance, in order to avoid 
risk of diverging jurisprudence and unequal treatment. In our opinion, 
this objective could be better achieved through the continuing training 
of judges and prosecutors about the different system of protection of 
human rights and their co-ordination.
the international recognition of rights and their actual implementation by 
domestic court, and by public organs in general, was at that time one of the 
most disturbing aspects of the international effort to ensure respect for human 
dignity.
27 See Article 35, §1, ECHR, on admissibility criteria, reading that: “1. The Court may 
only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, 
according to the generally recognised rules of international law...”.
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